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ADVANCEMENTS: III*
Harold I. Elbertt

IX
TRANSACTIONS NEGATING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF ADVANCEMENTS

A. Maintenance and Education of a Child

M

states have statutes which provide that support, maintenance and education of a child will not be considered an advancement unless the parent intended it as such.384 The Kentucky
statute is typical and it reads in part as follows: " . . . the maintaining
or educating or the giving of money, to a child or grandchild without
any view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed an
advancement."885 Most states do not have statutes of that type but
by judicial decision reach a result that is in accord with the statutory
provision just quoted.386
.ANY

I. Where Money is Given for the _Support and Maintenance of
a Minor Child. Where a child is under legal age and money is given
him or expended on his behalf for support and maintenance, the
transaction is not an advancement.387 A parent is under a legal
obligation to support his child and the presumption is that he intends
to ful6.ll the duty that society placed on him.388 However, the parent,
if he so desires, may charge support and maintenance to a minor child
as an advancement.389 In Colorado, by virtue of statute, a parent
cannot, unless he accomplishes the result by will, charge money e."C,,. A dissertation su'bmitted to the faculty of the School of Law of the University of
Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. Part I was
pu'blished in March 1953, Vol. 51, pp. 665-704. Part II was pu'blished in December 1953,
Vol. 52, pp. 231-264.
t Member, Missouri and Oklahoma Bars.-Ed.
384.A]a. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §19; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §ll9; Colo.
Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §6; D.C. Code (1940) §18-707; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 193'7)
§ll3-1013; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1933) §6-1504; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §39l.140; Md.
Ann. Code Gen. Laws (1932) art. 93, §133; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §312; N.Y.
Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-2505.
885 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140.
8BBPaclcard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149 P. 404 (1915); Bissell v. Bissell, 120 Iowa
127, 94 N.W. 465 (1903); Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875).
3B7Ibid. Cf. Greene v. Greene, 145 Miss. 87, llO S. 218 (1926); Hatfield v. Minet,
L.R. 8 Ch. Div. 136 (1878).
888 Notes 386 and 387 supra.
889Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927). C£. Greene v. Greene, 145
Miss. 87, no s. 218 (1926).
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pended for support, maintenance and education of a minor child as
an advancement.390 He may, in that state, charge other money he
has given a minor child as an advancement.391
Many times a man advanced in years may have minor children and
desire to give them property for their future support and education.
Under such circumstances the courts hold that the conveyance is for
support, maintenance and education and is, therefore, not an advancement.392
2. Where Money is Given for the Support and Maintenance of
an Adult Child. A voluntary inter vivos transfer of money from a
parent to a child for support and maintenance is not given with a view
toward the establishment of the child in life, and consequently the
courts hold that it is not an advancement.393
As previously pointed out, the statutes in several states provide that
money given by a parent to a child for support and maintenance shall
not be deemed an advancement.394 These statutes do not make a
distinction between minor and adult children and the courts consequently hold that no distinction was intended.395 In Colorado, the
statute reads: " . . ·. maintenance, education or supply of money to
a child under the age of majority. . . . "396 In that state, even though
the child is of age, money he receives from a parent for support and
maintenance is not presumed to be an advancement.397
In England, a transfer of money by a parent to a child for the
latter's support and maintenance is never an advancement. For insoopagev. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927).
39llbid.
392Packard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149 P. 404 (1915). In that case a parent
deeded eighty acres of land to a minor child who had lost three fingers in an accident. At
the time of the conveyance he stated that he was deeding the land to the child £or an
education because he couldn't be a fanner. Held, that the value of the eighty acres was
not an advancement.
393 Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059
(1927); Crain. v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S.W. 67 (1908). In that case a mother
made advancements of $2000 each to her two daughters. She took care of a son, who was
of unsound mind, during his adult file. On the parent's death, the daughters contended that
the money their mother expended on their brother's beha1£ was an advancement. Held,
that the money so e.,:pended was not an advancement. Carmichael v. Lathrop, 112 Mich.
301, 70 N.W. 575 (1897). Cf. Hartwell v. Rice, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 587 (1854). In
that case a father-in-law gave money to a son-in-law to support his insane wife. The sonin-law executed a receipt for these payments which read as follows: " ••• as a part of her
portion out of her father's estate." Held, an advancement to the daughter.
394 Note 384 supra.
395Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059
(1927).
39s Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176.
397Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927). .
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stance in Taylor -v. Taylor,398 the English court held that payments ,
by a father to an adult son from 1833 to 1856 to enable the latter, who
had entered the church, to live (the sums so given were considerable
--sometimes as much as 2000 pounds a year) were not advancements.
In Georgia, by statute, money expended for the support and maintenance of an adult child who lives under the paternal roof is not an
advancement.399 However, if the money is given to the child for the
same purpose after he leaves the paternal roof, the presumption is one
of advancement. 400
3. Education of a Child. a. Ordinary Education. A parent
is under legal duty to give his children an ordinary education, i.e., high
school. Consequently, the courts hold that money so expended is in
fulfillment of that obligation and is not intended as an advancement.
The authorities are unanimous on that proposition.401 However, if
the evidence shows that an intestate intended to charge money ex.pended for ordinary education of one of ,his minor children as an
advancement, it will be charged as such.402
b. College Education. In modem times, more and more parents
are sending their children to college. We are, therefore, confronted
with the problem of whether a college education is an advancement.
In Kentucky, by statute, the intent of the advancer is regarded as
immaterial and all substantial gifts are advancements. However, a
proviso of that statute reads as follows: " . . . educating . . . a child
. . . without any view towards a portion or settlement in life, shall
not be deemed an advancement."403 Many other states have statutes
similar to the Kentucky statute.404 The courts, in construing that
398 L.R. 20 Eq.
399 Ga. Code

155 (1875). But see Hatfield v. Minet, L.R. 8 Ch. Div. 136 (1878).

Ann. (Parks, 1937) §113-1013.

-100 Bowen v. Holland, 184 Ga. 718, 193 S.E. 233 (1939); Neal v. Neal, 153 Ga. 44,
111 S.E. 387 (1922); Holliday v. Wingfield, 59 Ga. 206 (1877).
401 Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); Brannock v. Hamilton, 72 Ky.
(9 Bush) 446 (1872). In that case the money was expended by a grandparent for tuition
for the daughter of a deceased son. Garrett v. Colvin, 77 lvliss. 408, 26 S. 963 (1899);
In re Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa. (7 Harris) 431 (1852). Cf. Brake v. Graham, 214 Ala. IO,
106 S. 188 (1926). In that case a parent, who was advanced in years, deeded land to the
minor son of his second marriage. All of his other children had reached maturity, and he
was solicitous of this one's education. Held, that the transfer was to provide for the child's
education and was not an advancement. See also Packard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149
P. 404 (1915).
-102 Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927).
403 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140.
404AJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §19; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §119; Colo.
Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §6; D:C. Code (1940) §18-707; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937)
§113-1013; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-1504; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140; Md.
Ann. Code Gen. Laws (1939) art. 93, §133; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §312; N.Y.
Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-2505.
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statute, hold that money expended by a parent to enable a child to
get a college education is not an advancement unless intended as
such.405 All states, whether they have legislation similar to Kentucky
or not, are in accord with the decisions of that state.406 In South
Carolina, because an advancement is valued as of the date an intestate
died, a college education cannot be charged as an advancement. Such
a method makes valuation impossible and for that reason, the South
Carolina decisions are justified.407
The decisions and legislation in other states are not consistent with
the presumption that all substantial voluntary inter vivos transfers
from a parent to a child are prima facie advancements. An education
may be as valuable to the child receiving ·it as a farm is to his brother.
One may prefer a farm, another a college education: both are ways
of establishing a child in life. Therefore, the rule that a college
education is not an advancement is illogical. In addition, our advancement statutes are patterned after the English statute of distributions.
In that country, the courts hold a college education to be an advancement as it is given with a ·view toward establishing a child in life.408

B. When a Parent Is Indebted to a Child
Often a parent may be under legal obligation to a child, i.e., he
may have borrowed money from him, or he may have held money as
his guardian. If he, being indebted to the child in the above ways,
makes a voluntary inter vivos transfer of money or property to him,
405 Hill's Guardian v. Hill, 122 Ky. 681, 92 S.W. 924 (1906).
406 Gan:ett v. Colvin, 77 Miss. 408, 26 S. 963 (1899); Bradsher v. Cannady, 76 N.C.
445 (1877); Miller's Appeal, 40 Pa. (4 Wright) 57 (1861); In re Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa.
(7 Harris) 431 (1852). Cf. Mitchell's rnsmbutees v. Mitchell, 8 Ala. 414 (1845), and
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §19.
407White v. Moore, 23 S.C. 456 (1885); Cooner v. May, 3 Stroh. Eq. (S.C.) 185
(1848). In that case the court said at 189: "The rule of the statute is that the advancement
is to be estimated, not at what it cost, nor even at its value when given by the parent, but
according to its value at the parent's death. No matter whether the Negro which a father
bestows on his son, cost him much or little; it is the value of such a Negro at the father's
death which is to be charged to the son. So here, if the education of young May, general
or professional, is to be considered an advancement, its value is to be estimated by its
intrinsic worth, and not by the money expended in procuring it. Such is the imperative
direction of the statute; and I am at a loss for any rule by which a money valuation can
be placed upon the mental proficiency resulting from education, whether of the one kind
or the other.
''The utter absurdity of making the expenses of education the standard of the value
of the education itself, may be easily demonstrated. Suppose the same sum is expended upon
two children of manifestly unequal capacity; will each of them. have received an equal
benefit'?"
40s Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875).
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the presumption is in favor of a satisfaction pro tanto of indebtedness.400
The courts reached this conclusion on the theory that although a
debtor can make a gift to a creditor, he would in all probability prefer
to pay his just obligation:110 The presumption is rebuttable and if
the parent intended to make an advancement to his child, he may do
so.411 Where the parent gives the child more than enough money
to pay the indebtedness, the excess is presumed to be an advancement.412
In Hollister v. Attmore,413 an intestate, who was an attorney, drew
a will for his sister. Under the terms of the will, his son was to inherit
most of her property. She died before the will was executed, and the
intestate and another sister inherited her estate. They decided to
carry out their deceased sister's desires and gave the property to the
intestate's son. It was held that the value of the property was not an
advancement to the intestate's son because it was given in fulfillment
of a moral obligation.
The case of Hollister 11. Attmore suggests a very interesting problem. Suppose a parent is indebted to a child but the debt is barred by
limitations. After the statute has run, he gives the child a sum
sufficient to pay the indebtedness. On his death intestate can the
other children charge this to the son as an advancement? If the logic
of the Hollister case is followed, the rule must be that the payment
was in satisfaction of a moral obligation and not an advancement.

C. When a Deed to Property or Money Is Given to a Child
for Services Rendered

Often a child may enter into a contract with a parent under the
terms of which the parent agrees to transfer property to him for services
to be rendered in the future. On the parent's death intestate, the
other children may seek to charge the property so received as an advancement. The rule is well settled that a parent may contract with
a child and if the conveyance is a result of such an agreement it cannot
4.09 Patton v. Glover, 1 App. D.C. 466 (1893); Corbin's Exrs. v. Corbin, 302 Ky. 208,
194 S.W. (2d) 65 (1946); Brooks' Assignee v. Summers, 100 Ky. 620, 38 S.W. 1047
(1897); Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872); O'Neal v. Dwtlap, 11 Rich Eq. (S.C.)
405 (1860).
410 Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872); Corbin's Exrs. v. Corbin, 302 Ky. 208,
194 s.w. (2d) 65 (1946).
411 Haglar v. McCombs, supra note 410.
412 O'Neal v. Dwtlap, 11 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 405 (1860).
413 58 N.C. (5 Jones Eq.) 373 (1860).
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be charged as an advancement.414 In Kentucky, however, if the
evidence discloses that the value of the property received by the child
was grossly disproportionate to the services rendered, he is charged
with the difference between the value of the property and the services
rendered, on the settlement of the parent's estate.416
Many times a child renders valuable services to a parent over a
long period .of years, even after he has reached majority. If the latter
conveys property to the former in consideration of these services, the
conveyance cannot be charged as an advancement. The courts feel
that the parent was under a moral obligation to reimburse the child
and since the property was received in fulfillment of such obligation,
it should not be charged as a part portion.416
414Day v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930). In that case the consideration for a conveyance by a father to his daughter was the latter's agreement not to marry
and to care for the former. She performed her part of the contract until he died. Held,
that the value of the conveyance could not be charged to the daughter as an advancement.
Because the promise not to marry was part of the contract, the court refused to deduct the
value of her services from the value of the land. Groom v. Thompson, 13 Ky. L. Rep.
223, 16 S.W. 389 (1891); Cleaver v. Kirk's Heirs, 60 Ky. (3 Mete.) 270 (1860); Parks
v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1862); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 214 Mich. 12, 182 N.W. 1 (1921);
Comings v. Wellman, 14 N.H. 286 (1843). ~ that case a father, in consideration of love
and affection, conveyed land in fee simple to his son. On the same day, the son conveyed
a life interest in the same land to his parents. The next day, in consideration of the son's
agreeing to support them, they conveyed their life estate to him. Held, that the value of
the life estate was not an advancement, but the value of the reversion should be charged
as such. Jakolette v. Danielson, (N.J. Ch. 1888) 13 A. 850. In that case one son of an
intestate claimed that his father conveyed land to him in consideration of his promise not
to go to California. The transfer occurred twelve years after the promise. During that
period the son managed his father's farm on shares. Held, that the evidence ,vas insufficient
to rebut the presumption of advancement. In re Allen's Estate, 207 Pa. 325, 56 A. 928
(1904).
4tuDay v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930); McCray v. Com, 168
Ky. 457, 182 S.W. 640 (1916); Ford v. Thompson, 58 Ky. (1 Mete.) 580 (1859);
Gordon's Heirs v. Gordon, 58 Ky. (I Mete.) 285 (1858).
410 Day v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930); Mumford v. Mumford,
(Mo. App. 1917) 194 S.W. 898; Lisles v. Huffman, 88 Mo. App. 143 (1901). In that case a
parent, on the same day, deeded eighty acres of land to each of his sons and forty acres to each
of his daughters. The deeds to the sons recited a consideration of ten dollars each and the deeds
to the daughters recited a consideration of five dollars each. Shortly after making the
conveyance, the father said that he gave the sons more because after reaching their majority
they stayed on the farm and helped him. Held, that the conveyances were not advancements. Hattersley v. Bissett, 51 N.J. Eq. 597, 29 A. 187 (1894); Weaver's Appeal, 63
Pa. (13 P.F. Smith) 309 (1869); Stem's Estate, 3 Pa. Dist. 369 (1894); Beakhurst v.
Crumbley, 18 R.I. 689, 30 A. 453, 31 A. 753 (1894); Murrel v. Murrel, 2 Streb. Eq.
(S.C.) 148 (1848); McElroy v. Barkley, (Tenn. Ch. 1899) 58 S.W. 406; Johnson v.
Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 626 (1884). In that case Andrew Johnson, a former
president, handed an envelope to his daughter, Mrs. Patterson, and told her not to open it
until she reached home. When she opened it she found a deed to the farm on which she
was living. Two years before the conveyance, Johnson told a friend that he was greatly
indebted to Mrs. Patterson for her services at Washington. "She had shown great self
denial," he said, and "her care and economy" had saved him much money. He added:
" ... In the course of my business I have become the owner of the farm on which she now
resides, and I intend for her to have it as some compensation for her services rendered
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D. Burden of Proof
The burden of proving that a transfer of property is an advancement rests in the fust instance on the party asserting such fact. In
order to meet this burden, he must prove a voluntary inter vivos transfer and an intent on the part of the transferor to charge the transaction
as an advancement or facts giving rise to the presumption of advancement. When he has done this, he has met the burden and the presumption of advancement rises. The burden then shifts to the purported advancee and he must introduce evidence to rebut the presumption.417 Courts, on numerous occasions, have stated that the
burden of proving that a transfer is not an advancement is on the
advancee. 418 From our previous discussion we see that such a statement is confusing and misleading. This is caused by the failure of
the courts to distinguish between (I) the necessity of proving a
voluntary transfer and (2) the necessity of rebutting the presumption
of advancement. The proper analysis of the problem is illustrated
by the case of Stephens v. Smith.419 In that case, a mother who had
been living with her daughter for fifteen months gave her a check for
$300. On the mother's death intestate, the other heirs claimed that
the $300 should be charged as an advancement. The court held that
before the $300 could be charged to the daughter as a part portion,
during my administration." The court held this evidence insufficient to show that the
conveyance was in payment of a moral obligation and charged the property to her as an
ad\'ancement. Watkins v. Young, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 84 (1878). Cf. Rowe v. Rowe, 144
Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1926).

417 Clements Admr. v. Hood, 57 Ala. 459 (1876); Stauffer v. Martin, 43 Ind. App.
675, 88 N.E. 363 (1909); Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72 (1862); Pilkington v. Wheat, 330
Mo. 767, 51 S.W. (2d) 42 (1932). In that case an intestate deeded property to his son
for a recited consideration of $1000. Held, that where a deed recites a consideration the
burden of proof is on the party claiming advancement. By that, the court meant that where
the one claiming advancement proves (1) the deed was given without consideration or
(2) that the consideration was inadequate, the burden of proof shifts to the grantee to
show that the transaction was an absolute gift rather than an advancement. Lynch v. Culver,
260 Mo. 495, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914). In that case the grantee in a deed admitted that
the recited consideration had not been paid. Held, that the burden of proof was on the
purported advancee to show that the transaction was not an advancement. Ray v. Loper,
65 Mo. 470 (1877); Waddell v. Waddell, 87 Mo. App. 216 (1901).
418 Sewell v. Everett, 57 Fla. 529, 49 S. 187 (1909). In that case the deed recited a
consideration of love and affection and $1. Bowen v. Holland, 184 Ga. 718, 193 S.E. 223
(1939); Ruch Admr. v. Biery, 110 Ind. 444, 11 N.E. 312 (1887); In re Manatt's Trust,
214 Iowa 432, 239 N.W. 524 (1931). In that case the Iowa court pointed out that only
a slight amount of evidence is required to rebut the presumption of advancement. In re
Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa 611, 190 N.W. 30 (1922); Miller v. Richardson, (Mo. Supp.
1935) 85 S.W. (2d) 41; Kiger v. Terry, 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); Johnson v.
Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 626 (1884).
410 127 Mo. App. 18, 106 S.W. 533 (1907).
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the parties claiming the transfer was an advancement must prove
that the money was received as a gift. The court stated that before
the amount could be charged as an advancement they would be compelled to build presumption on presumption: (1) that the daughter
actually received and used the money; (2) that it was not given her
in payment of a debt; (3) that it was not intended as a gift but as an
advancement and that to reach an ultimate fact by such a process
would be violative of the rule that a legal presumption must always rest
on a fact and not on another presumption.
If, in Stephens v. Smith, the parties alleging advancements had
proved a voluntary inter vivas transfer, they would have met their
burden and then the burden would have been on the purported
advancee to show that the transaction was an absolute gift. The fact
that she received the $300 standing alone is not sufficient to show that
the money was received as a gift.
The case of Stephens v. Smith is correct Prima facie, a child is
entitled to a full share of his parent's estate. Therefore the burden
of proving that he received part of his share in the parent's lifetime
rests on the party alleging such to be the fact. When the party shows
that he did receive a gift of property under' circumstances giving rise
to the presumption of advancement, the rule that a parent intended
to treat all of his children alike comes into play, and the child has the
burden of proving that the parent intended an absolute gift.420

CHANGE

X
OR REvocATioN

A. Change of an Advancement to a Debt or Trust
When a parent buys property in the name of a child or gives the
child money or pays the latter's debt, the courts presume the transaction is an advancement rather than a debt or a resulting trust.421
If the parent desires to charge the transaction as a debt or resulting
trust it is essential that the intent to do so be expressed at the time
the transaction takes place. Subsequent declarations made in the
presence of the child are not admissible to prove that he intended to
charge a debt or resulting trust.422
v. Smith, 127 Mo. App. 18, 106 S.W. 533 (1907).
421Stacy v. Stacy, 175 Ark. 763, 300 S.W. 437 (1927); Robinson v. Robinson, 45
Ark. 481 (1885); Page v. Page, 8 N.H. 187 (1836); Thompson's Heirs v. Thompson's
Devisees, l Yerg. (Temi.) 97 (1826).
422Higham v. Vanosdol, 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140 (1890); Merkel's Appeal, 89 Pa.
340 (1879); O'Neal v. Breecheen, 64 Tenn. (5 Baxt.) 604 (1875).
420 Stephens
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Once an advancement has been made, the parent and child cannot
change it into a debt or resulting trust unless a new consideration
passes between the pai:ties.423 In several cases the child received an
advancement from his parent and subsequently gave the parent a
mortgage because creditors were about to levy on his property. In
all of these cases the courts hold that the mortgage, since it was given
without consideration, is void as to creclitors.424
B.

Change of an Advancement to an Absolute Gift

An advancer can change an advancement to an absolute gift. Since
such an act is beneficial to the advancee his acceptance is presumed
and he need not assent to the change.425 To prove that an advancement has been converted to an absolute gift, ex parte declarations of
the advancer are admissible as declarations against interest.426 In
jurisdictions which require an advancement to be evidenced by a
,vriting, the deliberate destruction of it by the advancor converts the
advancement to an absolute gift.427 However, if the writing is inadvertently destroyed or lost, the courts would undoubtedly hold that
secondary evidence is admissible to prove that a child had received an
advancement. Where the advancor charges advancements in a book
of accounts which was_ always in his possession, but marks or tears
out pages where advancements are charged, the courts presume that
they have been converted into absolute gifts.428
In Adams 11. Adams,429 an heir released his e:,,.'Pectancy to his
father. Subsequently they agreed that he should receive a child's
share of the estate. The court ruled that a release of expectancy is
a contract and cannot be rescinded by mere oral declarations. That
decision seems to be erroneous. A parent should be entitled to convert such an obligation to an absolute gift if he so desires. Since the
doctrine is applicable only to situations where the advancor dies in423 Harper v. Parks, 63 Ga. 705 (1869); Blume v. Krucheberg, 112 Ind. App. 390,
44 N.E. (2d) 1010 (1942).
424Higham v. Vanosdol, 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140 (1890); Dammets v. Croft, Ill
N.J. Eq. 462, 162 A. 734 (1932).
425Wallace v. Owen, 71 Ga. 544 (1876); In re Bugbee's Will, 92 Vt. 175, 102 A.
484 (1917); Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate, 47 Vt. 637 (1874).
426 Wallace v. Owen, supra note 425; Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate, supra note 425.
427Hartwell v. Rice, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 587 (1854); Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate,
47 Vt. 637 (1874); Oller v. Bonebrake, 65 Pa. St. (15 P.F. Smith) 338 (1870). In that
case the court held that the advancor must be of sound mind at the time he changes an
advancement to an absolute gift.
4 28 Marshall v. Coleman, 187 m. 556, 58 N.E. 628 (1900); Hartwell v. Rice, 67
Mass. (l Gray) 587 (1854).
429 82 W.Va. 244, 95 S.E. 859 (1918).
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testate, an advancement becomes an absolute gift where the advancor
dies testate. 430

C. Change of an Absolute Gift to an Advancement
When a parent has given a child property as an absolute gift it
cannot be revoked and made an advancement by the ex parte declarations of the parent431 or by entries in a book of accounts.432 A parent
and child cannot agree that an absolute gift be charged as an advancement unless a new consideration passes between them.433 However,
a parent can charge an absolute gift as an advancement by so providing
in his will.434 Under such circumstances the law of advancements
is not applicable. The court is merely construing the will and carrying
out the intent of the testator.

D. Change of a Debt to an Advancement
In several cases, heirs have claimed that their intestate had converted a debt into an advancement. A child may make such a claim
because his father died testate, thereby wiping out advancements. The
other heirs may claim that a debt was changed to an advancement because the statute of limitations had run on the obligation.430
The law is well settled that a debt can be changed to an advancement (1) by agreement of the parties,436 or (2) by a writing given
by the parent to the child and assented to by the latter,437 or (3) by
a writing signed by the child and assented to by the parent,438 or ( 4)
by acts of the parent which destroy the legal obligations, i.e., where
the parent gives the note evidencing the indebtedness to the child.430
430 Kuhne v. Gau, 138 Minn. 34, 163 N.W. 982 (1917).
431 Sherwood v. Smith, 23 Conn. 516 (1855); O'Neal v.

Breecheen, 64 Tenn. (5
Baxt.) 604 (1875).
432 Sherwood v. Smith, supra note 431.
433 Kuhne v. Gau, 138 Minn. 34, 163 N.W. 982 (1917).
434Jn re Hayne's Estate, 165 Cal. 568, 133 P. 277 (1913); Brunson v. Hemy, 140
Ind. 455, 39 N.E. 256 (1894); Albrecht v. Fisher, 14 Ohio App. 195 (1921). Cf. Pole
v. Simmons, 45 Md. 246 (1876).
435 Appeal of Melony, 78 Conn. 334, 62 A. 151 (1905); Olney v. Brown, 163 Mich.
125, 128 N.W. 241 (1910); In re Buchanan's Estate, 2 Chester Co. Rep. (Pa.) 74 (1883).
Cf. Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130 (1839).
436 Lindsay v. Platt, 9 Fla. 150 (1860). In that case a father-in-law and son-in-law
agreed that a debt of the latter was to be charged as an advancement to the fonner's
daughter. Farmer's Exchange Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d)
1063 (1934).
437 Cf. Hayes v. Welling, 30 R.I. 553, 96 A. 843 (1916).
43Sibid.
439 In re

Weaver's Estate, 5 Lane. Bar. No. 35 (Orph. Ct. Pa.) (1874); Haverstock
v. Sarbach, 1 W. and S. (Pa.) 390 (1841); Garney v. Garney, 4 Ky. L. Rep. (Abstract)
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Courts are reluctant to admit in evidence ex parte declarations of
the parent made out of the presence of the child.· For that reason a
statement that a debt is to be charged as an advancement is not admissible in evidence and when admitted is never sufficient evidence
to change the character of the transaction.440 In states which require
an advancement to be charged in writing the ex parte declarations of
the parent are not admissible to prove that a debt is an advancement.441
If a parent sues a child to collect a debt, such declarations are
admissible in evidence as declarations against interest. However, the
statement is not sufficient evidence to prevent recovery.442
A debt can be changed to an advancement by will even though
it is barred by limitations.~43
622 (1883). But see In re Bennington, 67 Misc. 363, 124 N.Y.S. 829 (1910). In that
case a son received money from his father. The transaction was evidenced by interestbearing notes. Over a period of severol years the son paid interest and possibly part of the
principal. The father later sunendered the note to the son. Held, that the sunender of
the notes by a parent to the child was intended to change the debt to an absolute gift.
440 Appeal of Melony, 78 Conn. 334, 62 A. 151 (1905); Denman v. McMahin, 37
Ind. 241 (1871); In re Buchanan's Estate, 2 Chester Co. Rep. (Pa.) 74 (1883); Levering
v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130 (1839); In re Weaver's Estate, 5 Lane. Bar. (Pa.)
24 (1887); Miller's Appeal, 40 Pa. (4 Wright) 57, 80 Am. Dec. 555 (1861); Porter v.
Allen, 3 Pa. 390 (1846); Haverstock v. Sarbach, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 390 (1841); Garner v.
Taylor, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900) 58 S.W. 758; Arnold v. Barrow's E."<r., 2 Pat. & H. (Va.)
l (1856).
441 Olney v. Brown, 163 Mich. 125, 128 N.W. 241 (1910).
442Denman v. McMahin, 37 Ind. 241 (1871); Haverstock v. Sarbach, l W. & S.
(Pa.) 390 (1841); Arnold v. Banow's E."<r., 2 Pat. & H. (Va.) l (1856). Cf. In re Dewee's
Estate, 3 Brewst. 314, 7 Phila. (Pa. Orph. Ct.) 498 (1896). In that case a father held a
judgment for $2000 against his son. Although the judgment was not paid, he satisfied it
of record. The son was not present when this oceutted. Held, that a parent cannot, by
release of judgment:, without the consent of his child, change a debt to an advancement.
The court seemed to think that if this could be accomplished it would be a method of
circumventing the statute of limitations. But see Appeal of Kirby, 109 Pa. 41 (1885),
where a daughter received over $1000 from her father and the latter took notes from her
for this amount. Later, the father subscribed a paper saying that the note was an advancement. Apparently, the daughter was unaware of the existence of this paper. Held, that
the acknowledgment signed by the parent was sufficient to show that he intended to change
the debt to an advancement.
443 In re Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa 611, 190 N.W. 30 (1922); York v. York, 187
Miss. 465, 193 S. 330 (1940); Hanssen v. Karbe, (Mo. App. 1938) !IS S.W. (2d) 109;
Wentworth v. Wentworth, 75 N.H. 547, 78 A. 646 (1910); In re Gowan's Estate, 285
Pa. 219, 131 A. 727 (1926); In re Knight's Estate, 253 Pa. 290, 98 A. 558 (1916); Jones
v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 237, 43 S.W. (2d) 205 (1931); Wyatt v. Wyatt, (Tex. Civ. App.
1945) 188 s.w. (2d) 685.
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XI
RIGHTS .AND LIABILITIES OF THE

p.AB.TIES

A. Rights of the Advancee
The recipient of an advancement acquires the same title the advancor has. If the property received by the advancee is mortgaged, he
takes subject to the mortgage.444
B.

Rights and Liabilities of a Third Person

Often an heir is in need of money and on his parent's death sells
his interest in the estate to a third person. Other heirs may seek to
charge advancements against the child selling his interest and the
purchaser may claim they are not chargeable. However, the rule is
universal that the purchaser takes only the title of the heir and this
interest can be defeated by showing advancements.445 The reasons
for the rule are (1) that a person can sell only property which he
owns, and (2) if the purchaser were permitted to take free and clear
of the advancement, a child could defeat the purpose of the statute
by disposing of his interest in the estate.446
The above rule applies even though the purchaser did not know
of the advancements at the time of the purchase.447 Conversely, a
purchaser from an heir stands in the latter's position and can compel
the other children to account for advancements.448

C. Rights of Creditors
Often a child is in debt to his father or has received an advancement from him. He may also owe money to creditors who seek to
444 Cf. Logan v. Ryan, 78 Cal. App. 448, 229 P. 993 (1924); Cox v. A.P. Green
Fire Brick Co., 230 Mo. App. 774, 75 S.W. (2d) 621 (1934); Mw:phy v. Nathans, 46
Pa. (IO Wright) 508 (1864). In that case one Michael Mw:phy entered into an agreement to purchase land from plaintiff. He had plaintiff execute a deed to one Woodside
who gave her a mortgage for $1000. The mortgage was never recorded. Nine days later
Woodside conveyed the land to defendant, Mw:phy's wife. Defendant's mother paid
Woodside for the property. Although her mother did not know of the unrecorded mortgage, defendant did. Plaintiff foreclosed the mortgage, purchased the property at execution
sale, and sued defendant in ejectment. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
Defendant was deemed the purchaser even though her mother paid the purchase price.
445Bamett v. Thomas, 36 Ind. App. 441, 75 N.E. 868 (1905); Corbitt, v. Wright,
120 Va. 471, 91 S.E. 612 (1917).
446 Finch v. Garrett, 102 Iowa 381, 71 N.W. 429 (1897); City National Bank of
San Saba v. Penn, (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) 92 S.W. (2d) 532.
447Russell v. Smith, 115 Iowa 261, 88 N.W. 361 (1901); Corbitt v. Wright, 120
Va. 471, 91 S.E. 612 (1917).
448 Nicholson v. Caress, 59 Ind. 39 (1877).
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levy on his interest in his father's estate. If the transaction is an
advancement, the estate is entitled to priority over the child's creditors.
If it is a debt, some states hold that a creditor who reduces his claim
to judgment before the executor or administrator takes priority over
the estate insofar as real estate is concemed.449 The reasons for these
decisions are (I) that real estate passed directly to the heirs or devisees
and not the executor or administrator, and (2) that the probate court
has no jurisdiction over real estate.460 Other states hold that the estate
is always entitled to priority even if real estate is involved.451
A creditor, even though he is not a party to the proceedings, is
bound by the determination of the probate court that a gift is an
advancement, since the court has jurisdiction to determine the interest
of each party in the estate of the deceased person.462
Where a parent gives a child property in his lifetime and it is
properly classified as an advancement a creditor of the child can reach
the property immediately.453
In Higham v. V anosdol,464 a parent purchased property for his son.
There was no agreement that the son should pay him for it. Subsequently a law suit was instituted against the son. While the suit
was pending, the son, ostensibly to secure the purchase price of the
land bought by the father in the son's name, gave his father a mortgage
on the property. The court held the mortgage void as to creditors.
The court pointed out that the transaction was an advancement and
that the execution of the mortgage, without the intervention of some
new consideration, could not convert the transaction to a debt.406
A parent may take title to property in a child's name or transfer
440 Comer v. Shehee, 129 Ala. 588, 30 S. 95 (1901); Home Mixture Guano Co. v.
McKoone, 168 Ga. 317, 147 S.E. 711 (1929); Dyer v. Armstrong, 5 Ind. 437 (1854);
Hickey v. Davidson, 129 Iowa 384, 105 N.W. 678 (1906); Veatch's Admr. v. Loverett,
265 Ky. 532, 97 S.W. (2d) 47 (1936); Johnson v. Hoyle, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 56 (1859);
Butler v. Lollar, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 199 S.W. 1176; Franke v. Lone Star Brewing
Co., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 9, 42 S.W. 861 (1897); Liginger v. Field, 78 Wis~ 367, 47 N.W.
613 (1890). Cf. Gary v. Newton, 201 m. 170, 66 N.E. 267 (1903); Sylvanus v. Pruett,
36 N.M. 112, 9 P. (2d) 142. In that case an advancement charged by will was held
superior to the rights of creditors of the devisee.
450 Meppen v. Meppen, 392
30, 63 N.E. (2d) 755 (1945); Proctor v. Newhall,
17 Mass. 81 (1820); Steele v. Friaxson, 85 Tenn. 430, 3 S.W. 649 (1887); Mann v.
Mann, 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 245 (1873).
461 Stenson v. H. S. Halverson Co., 28 N.D. 151, 147 N.W. 800 (1914); In re
Homstra's Estate, 55 S.D. 513, 226 N.W. 740 (1929).
452 Comer v. Shehee, 129 Ala. 588, 30 S. 95 (1901).
463 Bamett v. Branch. Bank at Mobile, 22 Ala. 642 (1853); Pearson v. Cuthbert, 58
App. Div. 395, 68 N.Y.S. 1031 (1901).
m 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140 (1890).
41iu Dammers v. Croft, 111 N.J. Eq. 462, 162 A. 734 (1932); Roland v. Schrack, 29
Pa. (5 Casey) 125 (1858).
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property to a child for the purpose of avoiding existing or future
creditors. Such a transfer is void as to existing creditors if he is insolvent or rendered insolvent by the transfer.456 An existing or future
creditor may also avoid a transfer of this type by showing that t;he
transaction was intended as a resulting trust rather than an advancement.457

XII
AccmINTING FOR AnvANcEMENTS

A. The Hotchpot Doctrine
The courts and textwriters often state that the recipient of an
advancement must bring property so received into hotchpot.468 In
that connection some courts and textwriters also state that the advancee
must elect to bring property into hotchpot before he is entitled to a
share of the advancor's estate.459
At common law the doctrine of hotchpot applied only to gifts in
frankmarriage. 460 In Thomas' Coke, the writer defines hotchpot as
follows:
"And it seemeth that this word (hotch-pot) is in English a
pudding; for in this pudding is not commonly put one thing alone,
but one thing with other things together. And therefore it behooveth in this case to put the lands given in frankmarriage with
the other lands in hotch-pot, if the husband and wife will have
any part in the other lands."461

In Blackstone's Commentaries,4 62 the writer, in commenting on
the above definition, said:
'' . . . By this housewifely metaphor our ancestors meant to
inform us, that the lands, both those given in frank-marriage and
those descending in fee simple, should be mixed and blended together, and then divided in equal portions among all the daughters. But this was left to the choice of the donee in frank.marriage; and if she did not choose to put her lands into hotchpot,
456 Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1 (1852); Hamilton v. Bradley, 6 Tenn. (5
Hayw.) 127 (1818). Cf. Nonvood Admx. v. Cobb, 37 Tex. 141 (1873).
457Bay v. Cook, 31 ID. 336 (1863). Cf. Barth. v. Severson, 191 Iowa 770, 183 N.W.
617 (1921).
458 Damron v. Bartley, 302 Ky. 83, 194 S.W. (2d) 73 (1946); 1 &r. Jtm., Advancements §80, p. 747 (1936).
459Ibid.
4G0Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852).
4611 Con's FmST I°NsnT£ITES *721; Co. Lrrr. *176 (a) §§267, 268.
462 2 B~CKST. Co:r.n.r. *190.
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she was presumed to be sufficiently provided for, and the rest of
the inheritance was divided among her other sisters. . . ."
Blackstone stated that he would hardly have mentioned this law
of hotchpot had not this method of distribution been revived and
copied by the statute of distributions.463
However, the word "hotchpot" does not appear in the English
statute464 or in the advancement statutes of most American jurisdictions. It does appear in the advancement statutes of Arizona,
Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,465
and the District of Columbia statute on advancements of real estate,4° 0
but does not appear in the District of Columbia statute on advancements of personal property.467
Under the common law doctrine of hotchpot, the donee in frankmarriage returned the property she received to the estate.468 Therefore, the property was, in effect, valued according to its worth at the
death of the parent. In England and all American jurisdictions, except
Connecticut, Iowa, and South Carolina, advancements are valued as
of the date when made.400 Therefore, an advancee cannot return to
the estate the identical property received by him.470 The value of the
property received by him is deducted from his share of the estate. In
the District of Columbia, by statute, the advancee may return to the
estate real property received as an advancement or account for its
value.471
Even in those jurisdictions where the statute uses the term "hotchpot" the advancee does not return to the estate the actual property
received. He is required to account for its value at the time of transfer.472 In those jurisdictions the advancee must elect to come into the
403 Id.

at lj'l91.
404 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10 (1670).
465 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §39-107; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §223; Miss.
Code. Ann. (1942) §475; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §311; Te.'!:. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
(1948) art. 2576; Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64-17; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094. That
word was formerly used in the statutes of Florida, Illinois and Kentucky; Lindsley v.
Mc!ver, 57 Fla. 466, 48 S. 628 (1909); Courter v. Courter, 283 lli. 127, 119 N.E. 63
(1918); Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 61, §15; Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 75, §28.
406 D.C. Code (1940) §18-808.
467 Id., §18-707.
408 Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852).
460 Part XIlI, "Valuation of Advancements," infra.
470 Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852).
471D.C. Code (1940) §18-808. That statute reads in part: " ••• such advancement,
or the value thereof. •••"
472 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §475; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1948) art. 2576;
Lindsley v. Mc!ver, 57 Fla. 466 at 467, 48 S. 628 (1909). In that case the court said:
"Hotchpot is the bringing into the estate of an intestate an estimate of the value of ad-
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division and distribution of t;he estate.473 The same rule applies in
Alabama where the statute sets forth a method of election.474
In Damron 11. Bartley,415 the Kentucky court, relying on American
Jurisprudence, discussed the necessity of the advancee electing to come
into hotchpot even though the statute of that state does not have such
a requirement. The American Jurisprudence article cited by that case
reads as follows:
"Generally speaking, before the doctrine of hotchpot may be
invoked in dealing with advancements, the donor must die intestate, leaving property by descent or subject to distribution, and
the donee must elect to bring his advancement into hotchpot with
the other heirs and distributees."476
The writer of that article relied on the case of Grattan 11. Grattan,411
decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1852. That case ruled
that the advancee had to make an election before he was entitled to
participate in the division and distribution of the advancor's estate.
The Illinois statute, at the time of that decision, used the word ''hotchpot." However, in 1872 it was amended and an election is no longer
necessary.478
The American Jurisprudence article is confusing and misleading.
The only states which require an advancee to elect to participate in
the division and distribution of an advancor's estate are those which
use the word "hotchpot" in their advancement statutes and Alabama,
where the statutes set out a method of election. In most states, since
an advancement is considered a part of the advancor's estate for the
purpose of division and distribution, the administrator charges advancevancements made by the intestate to hls or her children, in order that the whole may be
divided in accordance with the statute 0£ descents. When those who have received advancements decline to bring the same into hotchpot when legally required to do so, they may in
proper proceedings be excluded••••" Grattan v. Grattan, 18 ID. (8 Peck) 167 (1856);
Gowan v. Gowan, (Miss. 1892) 12 S. 29; Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739
(1889); Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo. 470 (1877); McCoy v. McCoy, 105 Va. 829, 54 S.E. 995
(1906); Hudson v. Hudson's E.'\T., 3 Rand. (Va.) 117 (1824).
473 Lindsley v. Mciver, 57 Fla. 466, 48 S. 628 (1909); In re St. Vrain's Estate, 1
Mo. App. 294 (1876); Flesher v. Mitchell, 5 W.Va. 59 (1871).
474AJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §21 et seq.; May v. May, 15 Ala. 177 (1849);
Andrews Admr. v. Hall, 15 Ala. 85 (1848); Taylor v. Reese Admr., 4 Ala. 121 (1842).
475 302 Ky. 83, 194 S.W. (2d) 73 (1946). The previous Kentucky statute used the
word "hotchpot." Note 465 supra. In the following cases, decided under the old statute,
the advancee was compelled to elect. Stone's Admr. v. Halley, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 197
(1833); Haden v. Haden's Heirs, 30 Ky. Q. J. Marshall) 168 (1832); Quinn v. Stockton,
12 Ky. (2 Little) 343 (1822).
476 l &r.. Jmt., Advancements §79, p. 747 (1936).
47718 Ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856). C£. Barnes v. Hazleton, 50 Ill. 429 (1869).
478 Courter v. Courter, 283 ID. 127, 119 N.E. 63 (1918).
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ments to advancees in a petition or motion for an order of distribution.
The purported advancee can take exception to the petition or motion
and the probate court then determines whether the transaction is an
advancement or an absolute gift.479 Also, if one child sues his brothers
and sisters to partition real estate, any of the parties to the action can
show advancements and the value of the advancement, if any, is taken
into account in determining the rights of the parties to the real estate.480
Since the old common law doctrine of hotchpot is different from
the modern method of requiring advancees to account for advancements, the courts should refrain from using the word. Use of the
word tends to create confusion with respect to valuation, to whether
the advancee must return to the advancor's estate the actual property
received, and to the necessity of an election. In jurisdictions where
the statute uses the term, the courts should point out that the purpose
of the word is to require the advancee to elect whether he desires to
participate in the division and distribution of the advancor's estate.

B. Time for Election
Earlier, we noticed that some jurisdictions require an advancee to
elect whether he desires to participate in the distribution of the advancor's estate. In those states the courts require the election to be
made within a reasonable time.481 Before an election is required, the
advancee must have full knowledge of the value of the estate.482 If
an action is instituted to partition part of the advancor's real estate,
the advancee may elect not to come in because his advancement is
more than his proportionate share of that part of the estate. For that
reason he is not barred from electing to participate in an action to partition another part of the advancor's real estate.483 When the purported
advancee claims the transaction was not an advancement, he is not
compelled to elect until the question has been determined by the
court.484 If a minor or a person of unsound mind has received an
advancement, a guardian must be appointed to make an election for
him.485
479Nelson v. Nelson, 90 Mo. 460, 2 S.W. 413 (1886).
480 Gibson v. Johnson, 331 Mo. 1198, 56 S.W. (2d) 783 (1932); Pilkington v.
Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. (2d) 42 (1932).

481 Grattan v. Grattan, 18 ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856).

482 Hamer v. Hamer, 4 Strob. Eq. (S.C.) 124 (1850).
483 Belle v. Brown, 37 Ore. 588, 61 P. 1024 (1900); Persinger

v. Simmons, 25 Gratt.
(Va.) 238 (1874); Knight v. Oliver, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 33 (1855).
484Ladd v. Stephens, 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898).
485 Andrews Admr. v. Hall, 15 Ala. 85 (1848); Grattan v. Grattan, 18 ill. (8 Peck)
167 (1856). Cf. Barnes v. Hazleton, 50 ill. 429 (1869).
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Since an advancee does not return to the estate the actual property
received, and sincp if he has received more than his share of the estate
he need not account for the excess, an election to participate in the
estate should always be made.

C.

Property to be Accounted For

In its origin the doctrine of advancements made no distinction
between real and personal property except that the heir at law, because
of the feudal rule of primogeniture, did not have to account for advancements in real property. Under present statutes, all children,
including the oldest son, must account for all advancements.486
In most states, by statute, the value of an advancement made in
real estate is considered as part of the real estate, and the value of an
advancement made in personal property is considered as part of the
personal estate. An advancement in real estate is deducted fust from
the real estate, but if the advancement exceeds the value of the real
estate, it is qeducted from the advancee's share of the personal estate.
Likewise, an advancement in personal property is deducted first from
the personal property and if it exceeds the advancee's share of the
personal estate, it is deducted from the advancee's share of real estate.487
The reason for the rule is that title to real estate passes directly to the
heirs and can be divided only by agreement or partition,488 while the
personal property passes to the administrator.489 Another possible reason is that in most states probate courts do not have jurisdiction over
the real estate of a deceased person.490
In many states the statute provides that where an advancement
has been made in real estate or personal estate or both, it is considered
as a part of the estate of the decedent.491 Under a statute of that type
V, "Property Subject to Advancement," 51 M:rOH. L. REv. 696 (1953).
Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §16; D.C. Code (1940) §18-707; D.C. Code
(1940) §18-808; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §6; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178
(159); Ivlinn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.531; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-114; N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §§85, 86; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-21; Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-303; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§8402a, 8403;
Vt. Stat. (1947) §3068; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1350; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.26;
First Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 220 Ala. 654, 127 S. 221 (1930); Terry v. Dayton, 31
Barb. (N.Y.) 519 (1860); Hicks v. Gildersleeve, 4 Abb. Prac. (N.Y.) 1 (1856); Melvin
v. Bullard, 82 N.C. 33 (1855); Appeal of Fleming, 5 Phila. (Pa.) 351 (1863). Cf. Del.
Rev. Code (1935) §§3752, 3851; ill. Ann. Stat. (1947) c. 3, §166; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(1943) §29-1, sub. 2.
488 33 C.J.S., E."ecutors and Administrators §252, p. 1262 (1942).
489 Id., §299, :p. 1341.
400 Cf. Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889).
491Arlz. Code Ann. (1939) §39-107; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §ll6; Cal.
Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §223; Conn. Gen.
486 Part
487 Ala.
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the value of an advancement is deducted from either the real or
personal estate and if it exceeds the real or personal estate, it is deducted
from the other.492 On the distribution of the personal estate, the
probate court, although it does not have jurisdiction over land, has the
power to deduct the value of an advancement in real estate from the
advancee's share of the personal estate.493
The Indiana statute reads in part as follows:
"If any child or other lineal descendant of such deceased
person shall have been advanced by the deceased, by settlement or
portion of real or personal estate, the value thereof shall be
reckoned with that part of the surplus of the personal estate which
shall remain to be distributed among the children. . . ."40 ~
Although that statute indicates that advancements can be deducted only
from the personal estate, the Indiana court holds that the advancements
are first equalized from the personal estate and, if that is impossible,
the balance is deducted from the real estate.405
In some jurisdictions the statute charging personal property as an
advancement is separate and distinct from the statute charging real
property as an advancement. In addition, the statute does not provide that if the advancement in personal estate exceeds the advancee's
share of the personal estate, it shall be deducted from his share of the
real estate, but is silent on that point.406 Under a statute of that type
if the advancement in personal property exceeds the advancee's share,
the balance cannot be deducted from his share of the real property.497

D. Computation of Advancements on the Distribution of an Estate
Earlier we saw that advancements are treated as part of the estate
of the intestate for the purpose of determining the amount to which
Stat. (1949) §7058; Fla. Stat. (1941) §734.07; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937) §113-1016;
Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; Kan. Laws (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1948) §391.140; Mass. Gen. Stat. (1932) c. 196, §3; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §475;
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §311; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-301;
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2112; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §223; Pa. Stat. Ann: (Supp.
1949) tit. 20, §1.9; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 567, §22; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1948)
art. 2576; Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64-17; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094.
402 Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889); Bemis v. Stearns, 16 Mass.
200 (1819).
403 Elliott v. Wilson, supra note 492.
494 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §6-1503.
-1osBamett v. Thomas, 36 Ind. App. 441, 75 N.E. 868 (1905). Cf. Dyer v. Armstrong, 5 Ind. 437 (1854).
490 Cf. Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 61, §15; Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 75, §28.
-101 South's Heirs v. Hoy's Heirs, 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 88 (1825); Quinn v. Stockton, 12 Ky. (2 Little) 343 (1822).
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each heir is entitled. Suppose that an intestate, during his lifetime,
gave one of his children $1500 and another $2000 as an advancement
and did not make an advancement to any of his three other children.
On his death his net estate to be distributed is valued at $50,000. If
none of the children had received an advancement, each child would
have received $10,000. In this case, since two of the children had
received advancements, the amounts received by them are added to
the $50,000, leaving a net estate of $53,500 subject to distribution.
The $53,500 is then divided by five and each child is entitled to
$10,700. Since one child received $1500 as an advancement, that
sum is deducted from his share of the estate and he receives $9200.
Since another child received $2000 as an advancement, that sum is
deducted from his share and he receives $8700.498

E. Duty of the Advancee

to Account Where He Has Received by
Way of Advancement More Than His Share of the Real and
Personal Property

Often an advancee receives by way of advancement more than his
proportionate share of the advancor's estate. The problem is then
presented as to whether he must refund the excess. In twenty-four
states the problem is solved by legislative enactment. In those jurisdictions the statute provides that if the advancement shall exceed the
share of the heir, he shall be excluded from any further portion of
the estate, but he shall not be required to refund any portion of such
advancement.499 In other states the statute is silent on this subject
but the cases hold that the advancee is not required to refund the
excess.600 The reason for the rule is that an advancement is a com49SPitts v. Metzger, 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610 (1916); In re Laughlin's
Estate, 157 Pa. Super. 166, 42 A. (2d) 173 (1945), reversed 354 Pa. 43, 46 A. (2d) 477
• (1946); In re Hawley's Estate, 58 Montq. (Pa.) 285 (1942); Doverspike's Estate, 61 Pa.
Super. 318 (1915); Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W.Va. 205, 8 S.E. (2d) 189
(1940).
499 Alii. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §15; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051;
Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §223; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-108; lli. Ann. Stat.
(1947) c. 3, §166; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §2354; Iowa Code (1946) §636.44;
Kan. Laws (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §5; Mass. Gen.
Laws (1932) c. 196, §3; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 (158); Minn. Stat. Ann.
(1946) §525.53; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-413; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-113;
Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-302; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2113;
Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-20; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §224; Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-302; S.D. Code (1939) §56.0115; Utah Code Ann. (1943)
§101-4-19; Vt. Stat. (1947) §3067; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1349; Wis. Stat.
(1947) §318.25.
600 Farmer's Exchange Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d)
1063 (1934); Marston v. Lord, 65 N.H. 4, 17 A. 980 (1888); Gaylord v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 122 W.Va. 205, 8 S.E. (2d) 189 (1940).
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pleted gift. Therefore, in the absence of an express provision in the
statute, the courts will not infer that the legislature intended to require
an advancee to refund any portion of such advancement.601
Suppose an intestate, during his lifetime, gave two of his children
$1000 each and his other child $10,000 as advancements. On his
death his net estate to be distributed among his children is $15,000.
In determining whether he is entitled to a share of the estate, the
child who received the $10,000 advancement must add the two $1000
advancements and the $10,000 to the $15,000 estate. When this
is accomplished the estate is increased to $27,000 and each child would
be entitled to one-third of the estate or $9000. Since one child had
received $10,000 he cannot participate in the estate and he cannot
be compelled to return the excess of $1000 to the estate. The $10,000
is then deducted from the $27,000, leaving an estate of $17,000 to
be distributed among the two other children. They are each entitled
to one-half of the estate of $8500; but since each received $1000
as an advancement, that amount is deducted from their share and they
received $7500 each.

F. Duty of a Grandchild to Account for an
Advancement Made to His Parent

Often a parent makes an advancement to one of his children who
predeceases him leaving children of his own. Suppose that on the
advancor's death intestate, he is survived by two sons and the children
of the deceased son. The problem is then presented as to whether
the children of the deceased son are chargeable with advancements
made to their father. In most jurisdictions they are, by statute,
charged with advancements made to their parents.502 In those jurisdictions where the statute does not expressly cover the subject, the
u0l Marston v. Lord, supra note 500.
u02AJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §18; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §116; Cal.
Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051; Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7058; D.C. Code
(1940) §18-707; Fla. Stat. (1941) §734.07; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937) §113-1016;
Ill. Ann. Stat. (1947) c. 3, §166; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §6-1503; Kan. Laws
(1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140; La. Civ. Code (1945) art.
1240; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §6; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 93, §133;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 (162); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.53; Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. (1947) §91-416; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-117; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§3:5-2; N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1941)
§9882-305; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2116; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-21;
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §227; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-306; S.C. Code Ann.
(1942) §8909; S.D. Code (1939) §56-1118; Utah Code Ann. (1943) §101-4-22; Vt. Stat.
(1947) §3069; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1353; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.28.
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courts hold that they take by right of representation and that, therefore, advancements made to their parents are chargeable to them.603
Conversely, since the grandchildren take by representation, they can
take advantage of advancements made to other children. Thus, if
A makes an advancement of $1000 to his son B and makes no advancement to his son C, and C dies before A, leaving issue, the children of
Care entitled to have the transfer of $1000 to B charged as an advancement.504
Suppose that A had three children, X, Y and Z, all of whom predeceased him. He made an advancement to X but not to Y and Z.
On his death intestate, the persons who are entitled to his estate are
the children of X, Y and Z. Since they inherit per capita, the children
of Y and Z are not entitled to have the advancement made to X charged
as part of the share to which Xs children are entitled. In Louisiana,
the problem is covered by statute.506 In other states, the result is
reached by judicial decision.506 The authors of the Model Probate
Code take the position that the grandchildren who inherit from their
grandparent per capita should be charged with advancements made
to their parents.507
The rule, as disclosed by courts and legislative enactment, is, in
the writer's opinion, preferable. The purpose of advancement statutes
is to preserve equality among an advancor's children. If he is survived
by two children and the children of a deceased child who had received
an advancement, equality can be preserved only by charging the children of the deceased child with the value of the advancement. Advancement statutes are not designed to produce equality among grand503 Douglass v. Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 285 S.W. 433 (1926); In re Williams• Estate,
62 Mo. App. 339 (1895); Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130 (1839); Earnest
v. Earnest, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 213 (1835). Cf. Parker v. Eason, 213 N.C. 115, 195 S.E.
360 (1938).
504 Tison v. Tison, 12 Ga. 208 (1852); Beebe v. Estabrook, 79 N.Y. 246 (1879);
Glessner's Estate, 40 Pa. D. and C. 271, 57 Montg. 78 (1940).
505 La. Civ. Code (1945) art. 1240.
.
508 Brown v. Taylor, 62 Ind. 295 (1878); Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.)
41 (1854); Person's Appeal, 74 Pa. (24 P.F. Smith) 121 (1873). Cf. In re Boss's Trust,
L.R. 13 Eq. 286 (1871). In that case one-fifth of a testator's estate was to be distributed
pursuant to the statute of distributions. At the time distribution was to take place all of his
children were dead. Only two of them had children, but the issue of one child had died
leaving a daughter. The issue of the other child were still alive. Held, that they inherit
per stirpes and not per capita. Likewise, if an advancor's children all predeceased him and
all the children of one child predeceased the advancor but one of them was survived by a
child, advancements would be chargeable because the grandchildren and great-grandchild
inherit per stirpes and not per capita.
507 S:mms ..m1> BASYE, PRoBLEMs IN PROBATE LAw 67 (1946).
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children and consequently advancements made to their parents should
not be charged to them when they inherit per capita.

XIII
VALUATION OF Anv.ANCEMBNTS

In most jurisdictions, by statute,608 and in states where there is no
legislation dealing with valuation, the property is valued as of the date
when the advancement was made.609 The reason for the rule is that
the gift is complete when made. Therefore, to value the property as
of another date may be unjust to the advancee or other heirs. This
rule allows the advancee to take advantage of any enhancement in
value and at the same time allows the other heirs to have a value placed
on the property before it has had an opportunity to deteriorate.
Such a rule protects an ambitious child who may through hard
work and effort cause the property to enhance in value and, at the
same time, it protects the other heirs against a child who may permit
the property to decrease in value.610
In South Carolina and Iowa the statute provides that advanceuos Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §17; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §39-107; Ark. Stat.

Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §118; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1052; D.C. Code (1940)
§18-108; Fla. Stat. (1941) §734-07; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Idaho Code
Ann. (1932) §14-110; ID. Ann. Stat. (1947) c. 3, §166; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933)
§6-2355; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.3178 (161); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.531;
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §475; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-415; Neb. Rev. Stat.
(1943) §30-116; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-304; N.Y. Decedent's
Estate Law (1939) §85; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2115; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin,
1940) §10503-19; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §226; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-305;
S.D. Code (1939) §56.0117; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1948) art. 2576; Utah Code Ann.
(1943) §101-4-21; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1352; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.27; 15
Geo. 5, c. 23, §47l(iii). Cf. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949) tit. 20, §1.9.
600 Turner v. Kelly, 67 Ala. 173 (1880). In that case, since the property had
decreased in value, the advancee sought to have it valued as of the date the estate was
settled. Dicken v. Fairchild, 215 Ky. 496, 284 S.W. 1101 (1926); Cochran v. Simmons,
211 Ky. 16, 276 S.W. 989 (1925); Edwards v. Livesay, 203 Ky. 53, 261 S.W. 839 (1924);
Myers v. Brown, 35 Ky. L. Rep. 240, 417, 97 S.W. 1110 (1906); Ford v. Ellingwood,
60 Ky. 359 (1860); Warfield v. Warfield, 5 Har. and J. (Md.) 459 (1822); Shiver v.
Brock, 2 Jones Eq. (N.C.) 137 (1855); Walton v. Walton, 7 Ired. Eq. (N.C.) 138
(1850); Meadows v. Meadows, 11 Ired. L. (N.C.) 148 (1850); Lamb v. Carroll, 6 Ired.
L. (N.C.) 4 (1849); Stalling3 v. Stallings, 1 Dev. Eq. (N.C.) 298 (1829); King v. Worsley,
2 Hayw. (N.C.) 366 (1805); Oyster v. Oyster, 1 S. and R. (Pa.) 422 (1815); McKelvey v.
Burrow, 89 Tenn. 101, 17 S.W. 1035 (1890); Burton v. Dickinson, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 112
(1832); Ingram v. Ingram, 130 Va. 329, 107 S.E. 653 (1921); Puryear v. Cabell, 24
Gratt. (Va.) 260 (1874); Beckwith v. Butler, 1 Wash. (Va.) 224 (1793); Isbell v. Butler,
Jeff. (Va.) 10 (1735).
610 Walton v. Walton, Meadows v. Meadows, Stallings v. Stallings, Oyster v. Oyster,
Puryear v. Cabell, supra note 509.
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ments are to be valued as of the date of the intestate's death.611 The
Connecticut statute requires advancements to be valued as of the date
of distribution.512 In these states, improvements placed on land by
the advancee are not considered in arriving at its value.513 In M'Caw
514
11. Blewit,
the South Carolina court stated the rule for valuation
in the following language:
'The true intention of the law is, that the estate of the ancestor is to be considered as a common fund, out of which each
child is to draw at the death an equal proportion. That part of
the estate which has been given is to be estimated at what it is
worth at the death, relation being had to its situation at the time
of the gift. Thus a father gives to one of his sons a healthy negro
boy of twelve years of age, and ten years after the gift the father
dies. If this boy be brought into hotchpot, his value will be
estimated as that of a boy of twelve years old; and whatever such
a boy would then bring, the child is to be charged with as an
advancement."
The fallacy of this rule is best illustrated by several South Carolina
cases decided after the Civil War. In those cases, a father, prior to
the war, gave a slave to one of his children and died subsequent to
the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation. The court held that
since a slave was of no value at the intestate's death, the child could
not be charged with an advancement.515 Cases of this sort show the
very injustice that may result when an advancement is valued at a time
other than when made.
Although the test for valuation of advancements appears to be very
simple, the courts have had considerable difficulty in determining the
date when an advancement was made. For instance, does the date
of making mean the date when the advancee came into possession and
enjoyment? The courts hold that it does.016
·
611 Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; S.C. Code Ann. (1942) §8909; Eastwood v. Crane,
125 Iowa 707, 101 N.W. 481 (1904); Finch v. Garrett, 102 Iowa 381, 71 N.W. 429
(1897); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) "'90 (1827); Hughey v. Eichelberger,
11 S.C. 36 (1878); McClure v. Steele, 14 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 105 (1868); Youngblood v.
Norton, 1 Strob. Eq. (S.C.) 122 (1845).
512 Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat (1949) §7058.
613 Eastwood v. Crane, 125 Iowa 707, 101 N.W. 481 (1904); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2
McCord Eq. (S.C.) "'90 (1827).
.
514 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) "'90 at *104 (1827).
516 Hughey v. Eichelberger, 11 S.C. 36 (1878); McClure v. Steele, 14 Rich. Eq.
(S.C.) 105 (1868). In that case an intestate died in 1859 and settlement of his estate was
postponed until aEter the Emancipation Proclamation. Held, that the date of death controlled, and the value of slaves was charged to the advancee.
616Wilk's Admr. v. Greer, 14 Ala. 437 (1848); Stevenson v. Martin, 74 Ky. (11
Bush) 485 (1875); Hook v. Hook, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 526 (1853); Clark v. Wilson,
27 Md. 693 (1867).
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In accordance '\\rith that theory, the courts hold that where the
advancor retains· a life estate the advancement is valued as of the date
of his death.617 The North Carolina court does not reach a result in
accord with this rule. In that state the court holds the advancee's
interest to be a vested remainder and values his interest as of the date
of the conveyance.618
If a parent conveys a life estate in real estate to a third person with
a remainder to one of his children, the child is charged '\.vith an advancement.619 Where both _of the grantees survive the grantor, the
courts have difficulty in ascertaining the value of the advancement.
The settlement of the advancor's estate cannot be held in abeyance
until the life tenant dies and the advancee comes into the possession
and enjoyment of the property. For that reason the courts have been
compelled to depart from the rule that an advancement is to be valued
as of the date the advancee comes into possession and enjoyment. The
value of the advancement is ascertained by taking the value of the
property at the advancor's death and deducting the value of the life
estate which is arrived at by the use of mortality tables.620
In South Carolina, because the legislature had not adopted a
mortality table, the court held that the value of an advancement consisting of a vested remainder in real estate should be, in the absence
of e.~treme youth or old age of the life tenant, one-half of the value
of the fee.Im
A parent may make a parol gift of land to a child and many years
later deed it to him. If, on the parent's death, the other children
attempt to charge the property as an advancement the court must
determine whether the property should be valued as of the date the
child entered into the possession and enjoyment of the property. Most
courts hold that the land is to be valued as of the date the child enters
into possession.622 However, some courts hold that the date of conveyance is the proper date for valuing the advancement.623 The basis
lil7Wilk's Admr. v. Greer, supra note 516; Gossage v. Gossage's Admr., 281 Ky. 575,
136 S.W. (2d) 775 (1940); Stevenson v. Martin, supra note 516; Hook v. Hook, supra
note 516; Clark v. Wilson, supra note 516.
GIB Raiford v. Raiford, 6 Ired. Eq. (N.C.) 490 (1849).
GlOGossage v. Gossage's Admr., supra note 517; Cain v. Cain, 53 S.C. 350, 31 S.E.
278 (1898).
G2D Gossage v. Gossage's Admr., supra note 519.
G21 Cain v. Cain, 53 S.C. 350, 31 S.E. 278 (1898).
G22Pigg v. Carroll, 89 205 (1878); McKelvey v. Burrow, 89 Tenn. 101, 17 S.W.
1035 (1890); Ingram v. Ingram, 130 Va. 329, 107 S.E. 653 (1921).
G23 Edwards v. Livesay, 203 Ky. 53, 261 S.W. 839 (1924); Barber v. Taylor's Heirs,
39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839). Cf. Ford v. Ellingwood, 60 Ky. 359 (1860).
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of the majority view is that the deed relates back to the date of the
parol gift.524 . The theory of the minority decisions is that the grantor
could change his mind and thereby annul the advancement.525
Specific performance will be granted to enforce a parol gift of land
if the donee has relied on the promise and made valuable improvements.526 Using this well-settled principle of law as a basis, the writer
is of the opinion that the majority view is based on the more logical
reason. Also, the efforts of the child may cause the land to increase
in value and an injustice would be done if he were not permitted to
take advantage of his efforts. Likewise, if the land depreciated in
value because the child failed to care for it properly, the other children
should not be penalized for his failure.
Often an insurance policy is an advancement even though the
right to change the beneficiary is reserved. Since the beneficiary does
not come into possession ·of and enjoyment of the proceeds of the
policy until the death of the insured, he must account to his father's
estate for the net amount received from the insurance policy.527 However, South Carolina reached a different result because of the peculiar
features of its statute regarding valuation. In Rickenbacker v. Zimmerman,528 the court e.'\.'Plained its ruling in the following language:
" . . . but the inquiry is, what a policy for a like amount,
upon which the first premium has been paid, on the life of a
person, with like expectation of life and of the same age as the
father of appellant was when this policy was issued, be worth on
the 12th of March, 1874, the date of the intestates death?
" . . . inquiry should be what would such a policy be worth
at the date of the death of the intestate in the condition in which
this one was at the time when it was issued, that being the time
when the gift was made. • . ."
"The question as to the payment by the father of the premiums subsequent to the fust presents more difficulty; but we
are inclined to regard them as advancements of so much money:
like the case of the father who, after having given his child a piece
of property-a residence, for example,-expends considerable
524 Pigg v. Carroll, 89 lli. 205 (1878); Ingram v. Ingram, 130 Va. 329, 107 S.E. 653
(1921).
525 See note 523 supra.
· 526 Lindell v. Lindell, 135 Minn. 368, 160 N.W. 1031 (1917); Seavey v. Drake, 62
N.H. 393 (1892); McCLINToCK, EQUITY §57, p. 91 (1936).
527 Culberhouse v. Culberhouse, 68 Ark. 405, 59 S.W. 38 (1900); Cazassa v. Cazassa,
92 Tenn. 573, 22 S.W. 560 (1893).
52810 S.C. 110 at 119-120 (1877).
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sums of money from year to year in making improvements or
additions to the buildings. In such a case, the thing given is the
money expended; and while it is true that ordinarily the sum
expended does not furnish the rule for estimating the value of
an advancement, yet where, as in this case, the thing given is
money, there is no other mode of estimating its value except by
.
"
the amount given.
Statutes in some states expres!ily recognize the right of the advancor
and advancee to agree upon the value of the advancement.629 In those
states the value must be set forth in writing. The valuation may be
set out in the conveyance or in an instrument executed by the decedent
or in the written aclmowledgment of the advancee. If the value is
specified in any of these ways, the courts charge the advancee with
the amount specified in the instrument. In Georgia, an instrument
setting forth the value of an advancement is prima facie evidence.530
In jurisdictions which do not have statutes permitting the advancor
to establish conclusively the value of the property, the courts hold
that the parties can agree on the valuation of the property.631 In Ladd
32
11. Stephens5
the intestate gave certain bank stock worth $9200 to
one of his sons. In a written instrument he valued the stock at $5000,
its par value. The court held that the valuation fixed by a parent on
advancements to his children at the time the advancements were made,
should control in determining the amount with which they were to be
charged in settlement of his estate.
The writer can find no quarrel with the court's decision in Ladd
v. Stephens. However, the broad rule announced by that decision
can be carried too far. Suppose a parent gives a child property worth
$5000 and without his lmowledge charges him with $10,000 as an
advancement. Under such circumstances the child should be charged
111.rith $5000. He did not agree to the value and did not lmow of the
529 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §17; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §118; Cal.
Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1052; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-110; ill. Ann. Stat.
(1947) c. 3, §166; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §5; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178
(161); Minn. Stat. Ann (1946) §525-531; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-415; Nev.
Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-304; N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85;
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2115; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-19; Okla.
Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §226; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-305; S.D. Code (1939)
§56-0117; Utah Code Ann. (1943) §101-4-21; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1352;
Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.27; Hilton v. Hilton, 103 Me. 92, 68 A. 595 (1907); Smith v.
Smith, 59 Me. 214 (1871); Power v. Power's Estate, 91 Mich. 587, 52 N.W. 60 (1892).
530 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Sims v. Sims, 39 Ga. 109 (1869).
631 Safe-Deposit and Trust Co. v. Baker, 91 Md. 297, 46 A. 1071 (1900); Ladd v.
Stephens, 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898).
532147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898).
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writing. The only logical conclusion is that he accepted the property
knowing that he would be charged with its actual value.
In Kentucky and South Carolina if a parent dies intestate his
children must account for all absolute gifts as advancements. The
only way he can avoid the statute is to give away all of his property
in his lifetime or dispose of it by will. Consequently, he cannot, in
writing or otherwise, place a value on an advancement. To allow him
to do so would be to permit him to evade the very purpose of the
advancement statute.533

XIV
INTEREST

A. Before the Death of the Advancor
Advancements to children may be made many years before the
advancor's death. One might well argue that since the advancee had
the use of the property for a long time he should be compelled to pay
interest. This contention has been made on numerous occasions and
has always been rejected by the courts.534 All courts hold that interest
is not chargeable between the date of the advancement and the date
of the advancor's death. The following reasons are given as a basis
for the rule: (1) an advancement is not a loan or borrowed capital,
and if the courts treated it as such, advancees would never be willing
to accept property from their parents;636 (2) the advancee runs the
risk of loss, so he should be entitled to any increment in value, and
if interest is charged, the increase in value would be reduced;536 (3)
over a period of years the interest would amount to more than the
advancement;537 and ( 4) an advancement is an absolute gift.538 The
West Virginia court in Kyle 11. Conrad,539 eJ..-pressed the rule as follo:ws:
"Advancements are generally made to enable the child to
engage with advantage at the proper age in the occupation by
533 Hook v. Hook, 52 Ky.
534 Towles v. Roundtree,

(13 B. Mon.) 526 (1853).
IO Fla. 299 (1874); Boyd v. White, 32 Ga. 530 (1861);
Osgood v. Breed's Heirs, 17 Mass. 356 (1821); In re Howlett's Estate, 275 Mich. 596, 267
N.W. 743 (1936); Tart v. Tart, 154 N.C. 502, 70 S.E. 929 (1911); In re French's Estate,
268 N.Y. 370, 197 N.E. 316 (1935); In re Smith's Estate, 350 Pa. 418, 39 A. (2d) 513
(1944); Hillman v. Hillman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 135 S.W. (2d) 802; Kyle v. Conrad,
25 W.Va. 760 (1885).
535 Osgood v. Breed's Heirs, supra note 534.
536 Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo. 347 (1855). ·
537 Towles v. Roundtree, supra note 534; Osgood v. Breed's Heirs, supra note 534.
538Part ll(B)(4), 51 MICH. L. R:sv. 665 at 679 (1953).
539 25 W.Va. 760 (1885), quoting from Knight v. Yarborough, 4 Rand. (Va.) 566
•at 569 (1826).
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which he expects to make his living. If each child is advanced
at the same age to the same amount, each is advanced equally,
although one be advanced twenty years before the other, each
having the same capital advanced for his establishment in life."
The courts, in construing wills charging gifts as advancements,
apply the advancement rule and hold that interest is not chargeable
between the date of the will and the date of the advancement.Mo unless
the testamentary instrument directs that a charge be made.641

B. After the Death of the Advancor
Because the estate of a deceased person vests in his heirs or legal
representatives at his death the courts hold that interest is chargeable
on advancements after the advancor's death.642 However, the date
of death is not always the day on which interest begins to run. Some
courts allow interest from the date of the advancor's death to the date
that an order of distribution should be entered.643 Other courts hold
that interest does not begin to run until a reasonable time has expired
for the settlement of the estate,644 and a third group allows interest to
be charged from the day the advancor died to the day the order for
final distribution is entered.546
54.0 Harris v. Allen, 18 Ga. 177 (1855); In re Howlett's Estate, 275 Mich. 596, 267
N.W. 743 (1936); Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo. 347 (1855); Bro'IVD. v. Bro'IVD, 72 N.J. Eq.
667, 65 A. 739 (1907); In re French's Estate, 268 N.Y. 370, 197 N.E. 316 (1935);
Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. (2d) 797 (1939).
li41 In re Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa 611, 190 N.W. 30 (1922); Sprague v. Moore, 130
Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902). Cf. Brown v. Brown, supra note 540; Hillman v. Hillman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 135 S.W. (2d) 802.
G42 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Dfa:on v. Marston, 64 N.H. 433, 14 A.
728 (1887); Wysong v. Rambo, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899) 56 S.W. 1053; McKelvey v.
Burrow, 89 Tenn. 101, 17 S.W. 1035 (1890); Knight v. Oliver, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 33
(1855); Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W.Va. 205, 8 S.E. (2d) 189 (1940).
li43 Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. (2d) 797 (1939) (18 months).
Cf. Luneford v. Yarbrough, 189 N.C. 476, 127 S.E. 426 (1925).
G44. Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Towles v. Roundtree, 10 Fla. 299 (1874);
Sims v. Sims, 39 Ga. 108 (1869); Boyd v. White, 32 Ga. 530 (1861); Harris v. Allen,
18 Ga. 177 (1855); Tart v. Tart, 154 N.C. 502, 70 S.E. 929 (1911) (2 years); In re
Thompson's Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 292 (1880); In re Shurf's Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.)
360 (1880); In re Ford's Estate, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 97 (1875) (1 year).
li46 Wysong v. Rambo, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899) 56 S.W. 1053. In that case a child
could have had the estate divided at any time after his father's death and the advancements
made to his brothers then settled. He made no effort to do so for twenty-two years. Held,
that he cannot claim interest from his brothers on their advancements for that length of
time. The court allowed interest for two years, since that was a reasonable time for the
settlement of the estate.
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xv
CONCLUSIONS

The concept of advancements was unknown to the common law
but is a creature of statute. The statutes of each state determine its
force and effect as a legal doctrine. The £rst advancement statute
was a part of the English Statute of Distributions of 1670.546 All
American jurisdictions, except New Mexico, have advancement statutes, many of which are patterned after that English statute.
Most statutes provide that the advancement concept applies to
parent and child. Other statutes describe the parties to whom the
doctrine is applicable as follows: "grandparent and grandchild," "child
or lineal descendant," "children and their issue," "heirs," "children
and other descendants," "descendant or collateral," "descendant," "any
person to whom the decedent's property would pass in case of intes, "
,
tacy," and"any person.
547
The Model Probate Code applies to any person "who, if the
intestate had died at the time of making the advancement, would be
entitled to inherit a part of his estate." Under such provision advancements may be chargeable to a surviving spouse or collateral relatives.
Advancements are almost always made to children. On some
occasions they are made to grandchildren and on only rare occasions
are they made to a surviving spouse or other heirs. Since the doctrine
is designed to produce equality among the advancor's children, it should
not be extended to include other heirs of the advancor. However, an
exception to this rule should be made in favor of the advancor's grandchildren, who can only be charged with advancements when they are
received after their parents' death. A different rule would tend to
defeat the equality among the advancor's children.
The courts state that the purpose of the statutes of descent is to
make such a will for an intestate as he would have been most likely to
make for himself. In Edwards v. Freeman,548 Lord Chief Justice
Raymond said, " . . . the statute of distribution . . . makes such a
will for the intestate, as a father, free from the partiality of affections,
would himself make. . . ." In carrying out this idea, that the statute
of descents-including the statute on advancements-is designed to
make such a will as the intestate himself would make, the courts, in
546 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10 (1670).
§29, S:mms AND BASYE,
(1949).
5482 P. Wms. 436, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (1727).
547 Model Probate Code
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all American jurisdictions but Kentucky and South Carolina hold that
the intent of the advancor determines whether a voluntary inter vivas
transfer is a gift or an advancement. Underlying these decisions is the
fundamental American doctrine that a man may dispose of his property
as he chooses. In determining whether a voluntary inter vivas transfer
is a gift or advancement the court places itself in the place of the
intestate and seeks to ascertain whether he would have charged the
transfer as a gift or advancement.
In England, since passage of the Administration of Estates Act
of 1925, the advancor's intent'49 is determinative. Prior to that time
the cases cast a great deal of doubt on the role the advancor's intent
played in determining whether a transfer of property was a gift or an
advancement. Although none of the cases are squarely in point, they
indicate that prior to 1925 the advancor's intent was immaterial.
In South Carolina, by judicial decision, and in Kentucky, by statute,
the intent of the advancor is regarded as immaterial. However, in both
states the advancor's intent is material where the sum sought to be
charged as an advancement was expended. for the maintenance or
education of a child.
In most states, the courts, by judicial decision, indulge in the
presumption that all substantial voluntary inter vivos transfers made
by an intestate in his lifetime are prima fade advancements. The rule
is based on the idea that the natural affection of a parent is as strong
for one child as for another. For that reason, a parent will treat all
of his children equally so that all of them will share equally in all that
comes from him.
In Texas and in Connecticut, when the property involved is personalty, the presumption is that all substantial voluntary inter vivos
transfers are presumed to be gifts rather than advancements. The
authors of the Model Probate Code550 have incorporated the Texas
rule into this proposed advancement statute. That provision of the
Model Probate Code reads as follows: "Every gratuitous inter vivos
transfer is deemed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless
shown to be an advancement."
The Model Probate Code551 presumption provision is a great
improvement over the existing rule. If an intestate intends for his
children to share equally in his estate he would either (1) attach conditions to the voluntary transfer so it would be an advancement or
549

15 Geo. 5, c. 23 (1925).
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(2) execute a will charging the voluntary transfer as an advancement.
By electing to do neither of these things, the logical assumption is that
he did not desire to charge the voluntary transfer as an advancement.
Even if advancement statutes were abolished and all advancements
were required to be charged by will, intestates would continue to make
advancements, and misunderstanding among the heirs of persons dying
intestate would be increased. The danger of family quarrels created
by existing legislation can be decreased by enactment of a presumption
provision similar to that of the Model Probate Code652 and by restricting
the persons to whom the doctrine is applicable to children and grandchildren.
562Ibid.

